Trial courts have rather consistently refused to compel the prosecution to permit pre-trial examination by defense counsel of confessions allegedly made by the accused. This refusal has had its basis in the early common law practice of uniformly denying a defendant access to any of the prosecution's evidence.' Although inroads have been made into this attitude in other areas of discovery, 2 the view has generally prevailed that the accused is not entitled to an inspection of his alleged confession. 3 Moreover, legislation I The earliest leading caseisRex v. Holland, 4 T. R. 691, 100 Eng. Rep. 1248 Rep. (1792 . It was said that no principle or precedent warranted discovery, and if such were permitted, it would subvert the whole system of criminal law. It was also thought that discovery in a criminal case would lead to tampering with the documents and perjury by the defendant. For jurisdictions that have adopted this common law attitude see 6 WiGozo, EVIDENCE § 1859 (g) (3d ed. 1940); Comment, 60 YALE L. J. 626 (1951) ; Note, 53 CoLum. L. REV. 1161 REV. (1953 .
2 The defendant has been permitted to examine concerning pre-trial examination generally has been narrowly construed in favor of the prosecution. Recent cases, however, appear to forecast a more liberal attitude towards such disclosure. The problems involved in the discovery of statements and confessions vary according to whether such discovery is governed by the common law, state legislation, or by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
INSPECTION IN THE ABSENCE OF STATUTE
It is generally assumed that, in the absence of statute, a defendant is not entitled as of Atl. 640 (1935); People v. Parisi, 270 Mich. 429, 259 N.W. 127 (1935) Ariz. 127, 302 P. 2d 263 (1956) . People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84 (1927) . 8 See, e.g., Padgett v. State, 64 Fla. 389, 59 So. 946 (1912); State v. Cicenia, 6 N.J. 296, 78 A.2d 568 (1951 ), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 925 (1955 State v. Leland, 190 Ore. 598, 227 P.2d 785 (1951); State v. Clark, 21 Wash.2d 774, 153 P.2d 297 (1944) .
9 In the case of State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953) , the appellate court waived the rule not to review orders except final judgments and reviewed the order relating to the defendant's right to pre-trial discovery. The appellate court reversed the trial court's granting of inspection. The defense counsel argued that he was not appointed until more than two months after the Appellate courts have justified the denial by trial courts of confession discovery by imposing upon the defendant the burden of establishing the necessity of the discovery sought. This prerequisite has taken the form of two basic requirements.
1 0 First, the defendant must have had no access or opportunity prior to the trial to examine the requested documents." Failure to have taken advantage of prior access has been held to constitute, in effect, a waiver of the privilege of inspection.
12 Second, the documents sought must be material to the preparation of the defense,u and materiality in this context has been held not to have been established by a general allegation that the confession is needed to prepare an adequate defense. 14 accused had been arrested and made statement; to the police, and these statements were needed for a psychiatric examination of the accused.
10 InState v. Tine, 13 N.J.203,98 A.2d 881 (1953) , the appellate court reversed the granting of inspection because the trial court imposed the burden upon the state to show how it would be hampered if pre-trial discovery were granted; the burden was upon the defendant to show how the document would be material to his defense.
Some The defendant must show that pre-trial examination is required for the preparation of a specific defense. For example, where the prosecution indicated that it intended to use a confession for the purpose of impeaching the defendant's testimony, inspection has been permitted.
1
" If the confession were alleged to be a forgery or to be inaccurately recorded, the requirements of materiality should be considered sufficiently satisfied to warrant discovery. In contrast to a majority of jurisdictions, the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that the denial of inspection of a defendant's written statements would deprive him of his constitutional rights to a fair trial.
17 However, recent Louisiana cases have narrowly construed and severely restricted the application of that right.
18 Nevertheless, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has suggested that, in a jurisdiction which allows the court to decide before trial the question of the voluntariness of the confession, denial of inspection may violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The court maintained that the truth and accuracy of the statements contained in an alleged confession are significant in determining the question of voluntariness. If 1955) , the defense counsel sought to inspect the defendant's confession alleging that it was needed for an essential psychiatric examination of the defendant. The state submitted affidavits to the defense containing pertinent parts of the confession. The trial judge authorized the defense counsel to retain a psychiatrist to examine the defendant, but held that, while denial of inspection of a defendant's confession may not be the better practice, failure to do so would violate due process only if prejudice could be shown. Since the state informed the defense that sodomy and robbery were connected with the case and did afford psychiatric assistance due the defense counsel were unable to learn the contents of the confession before the question of voluntariness was decided, the court concluded that he would be unable to adequately argue the question. 20 However, the issue of voluntariness usually involves a consideration of the circumstances surrounding the taking of the confession rather than its contents." If, in deciding this question the court only considers whether the defendant was subjected to duress or coercion, the denial of an opportunity for the defendant to examine his confession should not be considered a violation of due process. It is apparent that only in rather unique situations has a defendant obtained pre-trial inspection of his confession. The injustice that may result from this attitude is somewhat tempered by the fact that the prosecution is foreclosed from examining the defendant's evidence because of the constitutional mandate against self-incrimination.n Moreover, if discovery were freely granted, the dangers of perjury might be increased since it would create an opportunity for the accused to explain away whatever admissions he may have made in his confession.n On the other hand, it is arguable that a searching cross-examination process was held not to have been denied. The court inferred that in other cases the practice of allowing the judge to decide the question of voluntariness before trial without granting pre-trial inspection, might lead to a denial of due process.
20 Even though the jury was to make the ultimate determination as to whether or not the confession was true, the court felt that once the trial judge ruled that th2 confession was voluntary the jury would be unlikely to think that the statements therein were false. 21 In the preliminary examination to determine whether an alleged confession is admissible in evidence, the only issue before the court is whether the confession was freely and voluntarily made without coercion or promise of immunity. The determination of an appropriate case should depend upon the necessity of such examination for the adequate preparation of the defense. In addition, such opportunity to inspect should be limited by the requirements of necessity presently adhered to by the courts. However, these requirements should be employed as tests for determining when pre-trial examination will be granted rather than as a rationale for consistently denying such inspection. 
Iowa 1950).
26 18 U.S.C. following § 3771 (1946) . 27 Upon motion of a defendant at any time after the filing of the indictment or information, the A majority of the federal courts have interpreted Rule 16 in such a way that confessions do not fall within its scope.
2 8 Primary significance has been given to the words "obtained from" or "belonging to" the defendant. It has been held that this language refers to documents which were in existence prior to the time that the government obtained possession of them. A confession or similar statement related to the police after arrest has been held not to be a document in existence prior to the time it was transcribed by the government and thus not something obtained from or belonging to the defendant." 0 On the other hand, a minority of federal courts have declared that a statement made after arrest is, in fact, something obtained from or belonging to the defendant and, th2re-fore, subject to discovery under rule 16.31 court may order the attorney for the government to permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph designated books, papers, documents or tangible objects, obtained from or belonging to the defendant or obtained from others by seizure or by process, upon a showing that the items sought may be material to the preparation of his defense and that the request is reasonable. The order shall specify the time, place, and manner of making the inspection and of taking the copies or photographs and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just. FED. R. CRmI. P. 16. These cases represent a liberal construction of the language of the rule and are in direct conflict with the majority view. A smaller number of federal courts have held that a written statement signed by the defendant after his arrest is a document "belonging to" the accused just as is a document which had been prepared by him before arrest.n However, a paper found in the defendant's possession before arrest is certainly not something belonging to him merely because his signature appears thereon. For this reason, it is difficult to understand why the failure to place a signature upon a confession obtained after arrest prevents the document from being considered as obtained from or belonging to the defendant. Moreover, it is the content of the confession which the defendant seeks to inspect. This has, in fact, been obtained from the accused.3 However, the distinction drawn between a signed and an unsigned statement may indicate that the courts consider an unsigned statement a part of the prosecution's "work product" and, therefore, not subject to discoveryM m Since it is the contents of the confession which is sought to be inspected, it is arguable that a confession transcribed by the prosecution is not a tangible object obtained from the accused as is required by the rule. See note 27 supra. But it is clear that if the defendant has written the confession himself the document given to the prosecution would be a tangible object. To hold that, if the prosecution has written down what the defendant has said, the document prepared is not a tangible object would be unrealistic. cated that an unsigned statement made by an accused after his arrest might be a privileged document because it constitutes the work product of the prosecution.
The lawyer's work product has been held to include such things as his notes, personal beliefs and mental impressions which he has acquired while conducting his investigation.-" If a confession were considered part of the prosecution's work product it would be a document prepared by the prosecution rather than an object obtained from the defendant, and thus would not be subject to discovery under rule 16. However, a confession, by definition, cannot be a part of the work product since a statement is made up of what the defendant has said. The function of a confession as an admission of guilt requires that it represent the exact language of the confessor; it cannot consist of the personal beliefs and mental impressions of the prosecution obtained in preparation for trial." Furthermore, a confession is admissible in evidence. It has been held that material which is admissible in evidence is not part of an attorney's work product. 38 In addition, courts have allowed the defendant to inspect statements made voluntarily to the prosecution by witnesses." In that instance the work product argument would seem a more rational basis for the denial of dis- Even if a confession were to be considered part of the work product it should not be exempt from discovery since the rule as finally adopted is silent on the question of privilege. Because the prelimi-, nary draft of rule 16 excluded documents that were privileged it might be inferred that even privileged documents which met the requirements of the rule were intended to be subject to discovery. On the other hand, if privileged documents are not subject to discovery under rule 16, a confession even if considered a part of the work product, should not be excluded as privileged since the work product is not a common law privilege and only the common law privileges may be exempt. Cf. Hickman Taylor, 329 U. S. 495 (1947) .
39 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (1946), accords the defendant in a capital case the right to a list of witnesses to be covery than it would when applied to statements of the accused. A confession should therefore not be excluded from pre-trial discovery on the ground that it is part of the prosecution's work product; it should be subject to inspection when the additional requirements of rule 16 have been satisfied.
In addition to requiring that the objects sought be obtained from or belong to the defendant, rule 16 further requires that the items be material to the preparation of the defense. In order to satisfy the requirements of materiality it is not sufficient to allege that the documents are generally needed to prepare an adequate defense; the defendant must specifically indicate how the documents are important to his case.' For example, if the defense is insanity, it must be shown that the psychiatrist requires a copy of the confession in order to make a full and complete diagnosis of the defendant's mental condition.4'
The additional provision of rule 16 which requires that the request for inspection be reasonable should be satisfied if the defendant cannot obtain the information by any method other than pre-trial discovery. The motion, however, must explicitly state what objects the defense seeks to inspect; a request to inspect any and all documents impounded by the government would be denied.n Rule 16 should thus be applied so as to compel pre-trial disclosure of the defendant's confession. Such inspection, however, should be subject to the enumerated limitations which are contained in the language of the rule. Nevertheless, as a result of the strict interpretation placed on rule 16, defense counsel have resorted to the subpoena provisions of rule 17(c) in order to inspect statements before trial. 
Federal Rule 17(c). This rule"
4 was designed to expedite the conduct of the trial by enabling the defendant to obtain certain subpoenaed documents before the trial. 45 Since the materials designated in the subpoena must be produced prior to trial or prior to the time they are to be offered into evidence, counsel have attempted to invoke this provision in order to obtain inspection of an accused's confession. 4 Although the Bowman Dairy case did not involve the question of the discovery of con-4 A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to produce the books, papers, documents or other objects designated therein. The court on motion made promptly may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive. The court may direct that books, papers, documents or objects designated in the subpoena be produced before the court at a time prior to the trial or prior to the time when they are to be offered in evidence and may upon their production permit the books, papers, documents or objects or portions thereof to be inspected by the parties and their attorney. Fn. R. Cnmr P. 17(c). been held that such a statement is not a document that might reasonably be offered into evidence by the accused, and for this reason discovery of confessions under rule 17(c) has been generally denied, Courts have nevertheless implied that, were the documents sought neither damaging nor impeaching, inspection might be granted. However, if the "confession" supported the testimony of the accused, the defendant obviously would want to use it at the trial but such use would be barred as self-serving statements,3 It is apparent, therefore, that rule 17(c) is not a discovery device and that inspection should neither be sought nor granted under that rule.
Some courts have overlooked the evidentiary requirements and indicated that discovery is obtainable under rule 17(c). 51 S.D.N.Y. 1954) , it was indicated that the mere allegation that the defendant cannot remember the statements was not a showing of good cause unless there had been a long passage of time to dim his recollection. The requirements of good cause are satisfied if: (1) the documents sought are evidentiary and revelant, (2) the defense after a diligent
